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The Incautious Media, Free Speech, and the
Unfair Trial: Why Prosecutors Need More
Realistic Guidance in Dealing with the Press
ANDREw

E. TASLITZ*

The ABA has proposed a new Standardfor the Prosecution Function, Standard3-1.7,
which addresses how prosecutors should communicate with the media. The core
portion of that proposal prohibits a prosecutor from making a statement raising a
substantial risk of materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding or of unnecessarily
heightening public condemnation of the accused. But this proposal is unrealistic.
Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that media information overload and its
fast pace result in media coverage of high-profile trials that heightens audience's
negative emotions while compromising their criticalfaculties. Audience members thus
are enraged at accused offenders and ill-equipped to judge the accuracy and
completeness of media crime stories. All media in such cases therefore raise the
substantial risks that the proposal prohibits. On the other hand, prosecutors'
commentary to the press serves importantfree speech and politicalpurposes,which this
Article details. This Article weighs this balance to come up with an alternative series of
guiding ethical principles, including, centrally, the principle that the prosecutor's
statements shall not aggravate the unavoidable risks posed to trial fairness. The
remaining principles detail how to give this nonaggravation rule greater specificity in
channelingprosecutors'ethical decisionmaking in communicating with the media.

* Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law; former Assistant District Attorney,
Philadelphia, PA.; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1981. The Author expresses his
thanks to his research assistant, Melissa Crespo, for her outstanding work and to the Howard
University School of Law for funding this project.
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INTRODUCTION

I have been asked for this project to comment on the proposed new
ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function,
specifically Standard 3-1.7, entitled "Relationship with the Media."'
Standard 3-1.7 has as its core provision a declaration that the "prosecutor
I. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
2010).

FUNCTION

§ 3-1.7(c) (Proposed

Revisions

May 2oll ]
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should not make or authorize the making of a public statement that the
prosecutor reasonably should know will have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding or unnecessarily
heightening public condemnation of the accused... ."' The sole
exception to this mandate is for "statements that are necessary to inform
the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's or law
enforcement actions and which serve[] a legitimate law enforcement
purpose (and subject to any exceptions in an applicable judicial rule or
rule of professional conduct)."'
The Standard also contains a number of other provisions, but they
are all ones that I see as playing a merely supportive role to the core
provision quoted above.' My focus, therefore, in Part I of this Article,
will be on the core provision's "substantial risk" language, which has
been favorably described by the U.S. Supreme Court.' The same
language also appears in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.6 My
argument here, however, is that the Standard is an unrealistic one in
high-profile cases, because the described risks to the suspect's reputation
and to his receiving a fair trial always exist and are always substantial.
Innovations in technology and the fast-paced modern lifestyle,
combined with changes in the structure of modem media, make the
public more likely to attend to and be deeply affected by dramatic, antidefendant media coverage-the kind of coverage most often embraced
by the media. Empirical data suggest that this coverage always raises a
substantial risk of negatively impacting jury verdicts.' Those verdicts thus
become based more on bias and presupposition than careful deliberation,
as Part I explains. The verdicts also stigmatize-or, "unnecessarily
heightening public condemnation of the accused" -defendants, even
those who are later acquitted, as Part II explains.
Part III, however, looks at the other side of the equation: free
speech values. Part III concludes that all high-profile trials are political,
thus having expressive value for both speech by the parties and coverage
by the press. These free speech values include debating the status of
salient social groups, such as those based upon race or sex, offering
morality plays to confirm or refute social norms, allowing the jury to
bring political values (lawmaking) into the courtroom, aiding in
"governing by crime" or rejecting it, furthering debate in the court of
public opinion, and promoting individual and collective self-rule.

2. Id.

3. Id.
§ 3-I-7(d)-(g).
4. See id.
5. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1077 (i9i); see also infra text accompanying notes
183-196.

6. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2oo).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 9-51.
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Part III.B examines more closely the expressive role of trial lawyers,
with emphasis on elected prosecutors, who have special free speech
functions given their role as perennial candidates for political office.
Prosecutors have a legitimate responsibility to keep the electorate
advised of certain classes of prosecutor activity, management of
resources, and policies, including those concerning some aspects of
specific cases. They also have a right to respond to prejudicial defense
statements to the press and to the media's own inaccurate coverage.
The Article concludes that prosecutors can serve their special
expressive role and the political functions of high-profile trials
adequately in ways that limit the danger to a fair trial. Because the
Standards are aspirational,' I articulate several broad guiding principles
for redrafting them. Primary among them is the principle of
nonaggravation, that is, that prosecutors should not make statements
that will aggravate any inevitable risk of unfairness stemming from media
coverage or defense press statements. Rather, prosecutors should speak
primarily to mitigate such unfairness. They may also speak to advise the
public of their actions in a case or to protect public safety. Otherwise,
prosecutors should be silent. The choice is a difficult and close one,
however, requiring a balance of competing values.
I caution readers that in this brief Article, I cannot treat these
matters thoroughly. My aim, however, is to prompt discussion and
debate, which may sharpen the thinking of the ABA's Task Force on the
revisions to the Standards. That, as I understand it, is the primary goal of
the nationwide roundtable discussions on the proposed Standards. It is,
in any event, my modest goal in the pages to follow.
I.

INFORMATION OVERLOAD AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN A HIGH-TECH,
FAST-PACED WORLD

Our high-tech, fast-paced modern culture overstimulates emotional
responses to overwrought, negative, and shallow crime news coverage.
These same factors compromise our ability, and thus that of jurors, to
critique poor news coverage effectively, while also reducing the empathy
that ordinary people and jurors need to judge another person fairly. This
Part of the Article reviews the empirical data supporting these claims,
concluding that media coverage of trials always creates a substantialrisk
of materially prejudicing a criminal proceeding, thus rendering any
embrace of the substantial risk test unrealistic.
A.

EMOTIONAL AROUSAL

Modern media technology and its fast pace combine with the highlyspecialized structure of an intensely competitive media industry to craft
8. See

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCION

§3-1.1

& cmt. (3d ed.

1993).
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messages that distort audience understandings. Audiences become
polarized, seeking politically-slanted and emotionally intense news
coverage over more accurate but dispassionate analysis.
i. The Effect of Modern Media Technology and Its Fast Pace
In everyday life, individuals routinely reach ill-informed opinions
about a wide array of matters. Most of us lack the time to gather
information independently about political, social, and economic events.
Nor do we have the time to investigate the reliability of data provided by
others. We get our information on matters of importance, large and
small, from the media or the Web.9 Our lives are busy, rushing to work,
school, or both; caring for children; struggling to enliven romantic
relationships; desperately seeking time for rest and respite.o We function
on overload.
Technology and accompanying cultural changes have worsened this
state of affairs." In a web-based world, young and old alike increasingly
expect to get information in seconds, with the click of a mouse."
Overwhelmed by information and choices, we settle for jumping from
website to website, rarely taking the time to assimilate information fully
or to critique it effectively. 3 This style of searching, repeated day by day,
has had demonstrable effects on learning styles and social relationships.
High information overload results in decisions based more on emotion,
assumption, and stereotype than on reason.4
The resulting severe time pressures and frequent interruptions,
common in our high-paced, mouse-clicking, multi-tasking world, cause
emotional arousal. An aroused brain selects which aspects of the
environment to attend to fully based on their emotional intensity."
Moreover, we attend more closely to negative than to positive
information." The phenomenon of habituation worsens the problem.
Like drug addicts, we become accustomed to a certain level of negative,
emotionally intense information, leading it to fade into the background.
Getting us to focus on an information source thus requires ever more
novel, extreme emotional grabs for our attention. 7
9. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Information Overload, Multi-Tasking, and the Socially Networked
Jury: Why Prosecutors Should Approach the Media Gingerly 8-9 (July 23, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
to. See id. at 4-5.
II. See id. at 5-6.
12. See id. at 4-6.

13.

See id. at 6-7.

14. See JACK FULLER, WHAT Is HAPPENING TO NEWS: THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION AND THE

CRISIS

IN JOURNALISM 6o-6I, 71 (20io); Gordon H. Bower & Joseph P. Forgas, Affect, Memory, and Social
Cognition, in COGNITION AND EMOTION 87, 141 (Eric Eich et al. eds., 2000).
15. See FULLER, supra note 14, at 6o-62.

16. See id. at 78-79.
I7. See id. at 71 (summarily defining habituation); MARK JOHNSON, THE MEANING OF THE BODY:
AESTHETICS OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 34-35 (2007) (defining habituation and its underlying
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Media Structure and Complicity
The media, traditional and otherwise, know this, preferring to use
emotionally charged information and stories to grab our attention.'8 But
that only fans the flames of emotion- rather than reason-centered
attention." The diverse, highly competitive nature of media coverage
also causes specialization by audience. Thus, Fox News appeals to
conservatives, MSNBC to liberals, and the Huffington Post to
progressives. But this specialization means that viewers in certain groups
hear primarily only from those with whom they agree. This contributes to
the phenomenon of group polarization: the members of a group
becoming increasingly extreme in their views.o
3. Resulting Cognitive Distortions
Polarization and the craving for negative emotional intensity also
contribute to a variety of cognitive errors. Among these is confirmation
bias, leading us to ignore, filter, discount, or distort what little
information we receive that contradicts our current views." Another
common error is the fundamental attribution error: the tendency to
attribute even a small sampling of a person's behavior to that person's
fundamental character rather than to his or her situation." This tendency
is especially dangerous in criminal cases, because it can lead to quick
associations of alleged criminality with evil." The "ultimate
[fundamental] attribution error" -the particular tendency to link action
with an evil nature based upon the actor's race-amplifies this danger,
given racially slanted news coverage and the disproportionate
involvement of racial minorities with the criminal justice system.' News
coverage also favors the emotionally gripping narrative over the
dispassionate, abstract argument. Stories grab eyeballs; abstractions
shutter eyelids."
2.

processes in more depth).
I8. See Taslitz, supra note 9, at to, 16-18.
19. See id. at 20-23.
20. See FULLER, supra note 14, at 69; CAsS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 11-13
(2003).
21. See Taslitz, supra note 9, at ro-lI.
22. See FULLER, supra note 14, at 76; RICHARD NIsBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 31 (1980).
23. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through PsychologicalCharacter
Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 110-II (1993).
24. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factorin Convicting the Innocent?, 4 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 121, 126-27 (2oo6).
25. See FULLER, supra note 14, at 12o-26 (discussing how the news media, while striking a pose of

objectivity, often suggests knowledge of that which it cannot know, such as a suspect's mental state, in
the name of telling a good story).
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COMPROMISED CRITICAL THINKING SKILLS AND JURY RESEARCH

The kind of quick, shallow reading encouraged by the Internet
compromises audiences' ability to question the accuracy of media
information or to deliberate about it effectively. Research on the effect
of media coverage of high-profile trials on juries suggests that the
adversary system fails fully to correct for these dulled audience critical
thinking skills.
i.
The Effect of Net-Reading
Net readers, who rapidly switch between sources and skim small
chunks of information, are less capable of questioning the media's
information Blitzkrieg. Explains Jordan Grafman, the head of the
National Institute of Neurological Disorders's cognitive neuroscience
unit, "The more you multitask,

. .

. the less deliberative you become; the

less you're able to think and reason out a problem.",,6 Conformity rises,
too, as we "rely on conventional ideas and solutions rather than
challenging them with original lines of thought."" Simultaneously, there
is a growing public distrust of "experts" of any kind, leading viewers to
favor Glen Beck over "traditional," expertly trained journalists.
Universities supposedly counter these trends, but that may be
wishful thinking, because increasingly affective learning styles and a
preference for highly emotional, adversarial styles of argument have
been documented among graduate-school-trained academics as well as
among the bulk of the populace -which lacks four-year college degrees.9
Other studies document the widespread inability of college students to
conduct thorough research and their reticence to test out the
assumptions in the views expressed on their favored websites or by their
friends through even quick online investigation.o This combination of
societal trends breeds viewers who are increasingly drawn to extreme,
one-sided, frightening news coverage, particularly of crime (always a
juicy subject), with a decreasing ability to analyze the information they
receive critically. This is a recipe for bias entering the jury room in highprofile cases.
2.
Impact on the Jury
The dominant view among jury researchers is indeed that pretrial
publicity has negative, anti-defendant effects in high-profile cases.'
26. DON TAPscorr, GROWN Up DIGITAL: How THE NET GENERATION IS CHANGING YOUR WORLD
zo8-09 (2009) (quoting Jordan Grafman).
27. NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET Is DOING TO OUR BRAINS 140 (2010).

28. See FULLER, supra note 14, at 5, 14, 87-88, 96-98.
29.
AGE 228

See,

e.g., MAGGIE JACKSON, DISTRACTED: THE EROSION OF ATrENTION AND THE COMING DARK

(2oo8).

30. See, e.g., LARRY
LEARN 155-56 (2010).

D.

ROSEN, REWIRED: UNDERSTANDING THE IGENERATION AND THE WAY THEY

31. See Joel D. Lieberman et al., Inadmissible Evidence and PretrialPublicity: The Effects (and

I292
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There is, however, a dispute about the magnitude of those effects.
Pessimists tend to find dramatic effects, while optimists tend to find them
minimal." Yet even a minor anti-defendant effect can make the difference
in a close case-precisely the kind of case most likely to go to trial. Most
other cases are typically resolved by guilty pleas or other less formal
means of case resolution." Furthermore, the continuing direction of
technology and related social forces discussed above should worsen the
ill-effects of media with coming generations.
Lawyers and judges tend to believe that remedial measures, such as
careful jury selection procedures, jury instructions, and venue change,
can effectively counter media-induced bias.34 Pessimists read the
empirical data otherwise.35 For example, with voir dire, potential jurors
often do not recognize their own unconscious or semi-conscious thoughts
and biases, and lawyers and judges have been proven ineffective at
discovering such biases, no matter how much they and paid jury
consultants are convinced to the contrary.36 Even a juror who, at the time
of voir dire, says that she is ignorant of any press coverage of a particular
case may simply not consciously remember what she has earlier seen in
the news. If she does indeed lack knowledge of case particulars, she
nevertheless may be affected by the overall anti-defendant atmosphere
that the media creates."
Optimists embrace the "cumulative remedies hypothesis" -the
belief that the combination of "careful voir dire, effective defense
counsel, cautionary instructions, jury deliberation, and presentation of
trial evidence under real-world conditions should cumulatively minimize
or even entirely erase media coverage's negative effects.", Yet, the
cumulative remedies hypothesis rests on an unrealized premise -namely,
that substantial improvements to each of these remedies must be made.
Indeed, the improvements may not be adopted either completely or on a
piecemeal basis. This reality makes the optimists' hypothesis appear all
the more unrealistically sanguine." Moreover, the combination of all
these remedies in the real world seems a lot to ask: Guaranteeing
Ineffectiveness) of Admonitions to Disregard,in JURY PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESSES

67,70 (Joel D. Lieberman & Daniel A. Krauss eds., 2oo9).
32. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Duke Lacrosse Players and the Media: Why the Fair Trial-Free
Press Paradigm Doesn't Cut It Anymore, in RACE TO INJUSTICE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DUKE
LACROSSE RAPE CASE 175, 182-83 (Michael L. Siegel ed., 2009) [hereinafter RACE TO INJUSTICE].
33. See id. at 190.
34. This was certainly the view expressed by some participants in the roundtables that were held
in connection with this project at American, Boston College, and Vanderbilt law schools.
35. See Taslitz, supra note 32, at I87-89.
36. See NEIL KRESSEL &DoRrr KRESSEL, STACK AND SWAY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF JURY CONSULTING
(2004); Lieberman et al., supra note 31, at 69,72.
37. See Taslitz, supra note 32, at 183-89.
38. Id. at t90.

39. See id.
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effective defense counsel in an underresourced criminal justice system is
alone a challenge.4 o In short, the wisdom of the optimists' speculations
still awaits further research.4 '
C.

DECLINING EMPATHY

Additionally, younger generations, who are accustomed to a highly
technological style of learning, spend much time texting, perusing social
networking sites, playing video games, and surfing the net. Schools
discourage close friendships for fear that such closeness in small groups
promotes bullying, including cyber-bullying.42 The reduced amount of
face-to-face social contact and the changing nature of the amount that
does occur seem to be having ill effects on empathy-one person's ability
to stand mentally in another person's shoes.43
Repeated exposure to violent video games may also reduce
empathy." One study, for example, found the current group of high
school graduates to be the least empathetic in many decades.45 This study
was not an isolated one but a meta-analysis of seventy-two different
studies of college student empathy.46 The metastudy found the "biggest
drop in empathy after the year 2000," with today's college students being
"about 40 percent lower in empathy than their counterparts of 20 or 30
years ago, as measured by standard tests of this personality trait."47
Numerous other converging sources of empirical evidence support a
similar conclusion.48

But empathy is essential to judging another person's culpability
accurately.49 Jurors must understand what the defendant thought and felt
and why before they can decide whether he acted, for example, in "cold
blood" or instead in the "heat of passion."o Jurors must be able to make
this latter decision relatively dispassionately, but the decision will be

4o. See generally NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM.,
AMERICA'S CONTINUING

CONSTITUTION

PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED:

NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2oo9)

(providing a

comprehensive report on the United States's system of representation for indigent defendants).
41. See Taslitz, supra note 32, at i90.

See Hillary Stout, A Best Friend? You Must Be Kidding, N.Y.
43. See Taslitz, supra note 9, at 29-34.
42.

TIMES,

June

17, 20Io,

at Es.

44. See KAREN E. DILL, How FANTASY BECOMES REALITY: SEEING THROUGH MEDIA INFLUENCE 67-

68 (2o09).
45. See Diane Swanbrow, Empathy: College Students Don't Have as Much as They Used to, U.
MICH. NEWS SERV. (May 27, 20oo), http://www.ns.umich.edulhtdocs/releases/story.php?id=7724.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Sara Konrath).
48. See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 9, at 29-34.
49. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Why Did Tinkerbell Get Off So Easy?: The Roles of Imagination and
Social Norms in Excusing Human Weakness, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419,431-52 (2009).
50. See ELLEN S. PODGOR ET AL., MASTERING CRIMINAL LAW 130-32, 147-49 (2008).
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poorly informed if empathy has failed." Emotionally overwrought media
coverage can only worsen this state of affairs.

D.

UP
None of this analysis means, of course, that a defendant in any
individual high-profile case cannot get a fair trial. But this analysis does
likely mean that there is always a substantial risk of this unfairness in
these cases. A standard that requires prosecutors to decide which cases
raise such a risk, or, in the words of the ABA, raise a "substantial
likelihood"" of such, and which do not is thus one based on mere fancy.
The purported distinction to be made does not exist. The same might be
said of the requirement that the risk be "material[]."5 3
Moreover, if the risk did exist, there is no empirical data of which I
am aware suggesting that prosecutors could make the case-specific
distinction (risk versus no risk) accurately, much less determine in
advance of trial whether the risk has truly been controlled and fairness
achieved. Of course, lawyers must make common sense best guesses all
the time in the absence of empirical data. But the substantial risk test
asks lawyers to make a judgment about a possibility that likely does not
exist, because there will always be a risk. The test makes lawyer
judgments on this matter particularly dangerous, because any judgment
that a substantial risk does not exist will be wrong.
SUMMING

II. PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF THE ACCUSED
If there is a substantial risk of an unfair trial from emotionally
compelling, anti-defendant media coverage, there is surely a substantial
pretrial risk of undue injury to the defendant's reputation for similar
reasons. Reputational injuries should not be lightly dismissed. They can
cost an individual money, jobs, political power, and social contacts.54
They can induce depression, poor health, divorce, and social exclusion."
Even an acquittal at trial does not readily repair these injuries.
Reputational harms can linger for years.6 Audiences wonder, "Was he
truly not guilty, or did he just beat the system?" Doubts remain. Even
when it is eventually possible to get past those doubts, the emotional

51. See Taslitz, supra note 49, at 431-52.
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2010).
53. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
2010).

§ 3-i.7(c) (Proposed Revisions

54. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena's D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 396, 404-05, 425-26, 438, 448 (2oo9).
55. See id.

56. See id. at 424; infra text accompanying notes 58-75.

May 201I]
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pain and social exclusion suffered will not be quickly forgotten, its
wounds not easily healed."
The white Duke lacrosse players stand as a memorable recent
example. They were wrongfully accused of gang-raping or serially-raping
a black dancer.' The Durham, North Carolina prosecutor, Michael
Nifong, and the media long portrayed the lacrosse players as racist
brutes." Some media reports used animalistic metaphors, describing the
players as "moving in a pack."6o The local Durham newspaper, the
Herald-Sun, claimed that the players brought frat-boy culture to a
"whole new sickening level."6 Campus protests and candlelight vigils
urging the law not to protect the rapists sprouted.6 A local Raleigh
paper, the News and Observer, suggested that the players were all loud
drunkards.6 3 Clergymen condemned the players from the pulpit; several
professors in classes in which the players sat denounced them as racist
rapists; cable news commentators agreed; and, one professor publicly
labeled the players as unclean frequent lawn-urinators, who made a habit
of slinging racist slurs.6 ' Protestors waved signs demanding that the
players confess and be castrated, and the local NAACP and university
president joined the condemnation bandwagon. 6 5 The players were
suspended from school, and many either had their education interrupted
or were forced to complete their degrees elsewhere. They became social
pariahs; in Newsweek's words, they were "[strutting lacrosse players[,]"
"macho and entitled," no more than "thugs."
The harm was particularly grievous for one player: Reade
Seligmann. Before the rape accusations, Seligmann's hometown
residents widely gave glowing reports about his character, as did his
teachers.6 He volunteered to help the needy in Appalachia and in poor

57. See Taslitz, supra note 32, at 178-82.
58. See Robert J. Luck & Michael L. Seigel, The Facts and Only the Facts, in RACE TO INJUSTICE,
supranote 32, at 3, 3-27 (summarizing case facts).
59. See STUART TAYLOR, JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND
THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE 64-66, 85-88, 1o3 (2oo7); DON YAEGER &
MIKE PRESSLER, IT'S NOT ABOUT THE TRUTH: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE DUKE LACROSSE CASE AND THE
LIVES IT SHATTERED 99-1o5, 147-56 (2007).

6o. TAYLOR &JOHNSON, supra note 59, at 64-66, 85-88, to3.
61. See id. at 90.
62. Id. at 66-67.
63. Jim Nesbitt, Team Has Swaggered for Years, NEWS & OBSERVER (Apr. 9, 2oo6),
http://www.newsobserver.cOm/2oo6/o4/o9/46527_team-has-swaggered-for-years.html.
64. See id.
65. See TAYLOR &JOHNSON, supra note 59, at 73, 85-88, 145.

66. See authorities cited infra note 75.
67. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 59, at 8 (quoting What Happened at Duke? Sex. Race. A
Raucous Party. A Rape Charge. And a Prosecutor Up for Re-Election. Inside the Mystery That Has
Roiled a Campus and Riveted the Country, NEWSWEEK, May I, 2oo6, at 4o).
68. Id. at 12-15.
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sections of New York City.6 His high school gave him the Fighting Spirit
Award for the strength of his character, integrity, and drive to excel.'o
The rape charges rapidly reversed his positive public reputation, bringing
the new brutish image to a much wider audience." Although eventually,
and slowly, the tide started turning in the players' favor, public
humiliation still hung over their heads. Seligmann described the impact
the experience had on him and his fellow players:
To see my face on TV, and that, you know, in those little mug shots,
and above it saying, you know, "Alleged rapists." You don't know
what that does to me and to my family and to the people who care
about me.... Your whole life, you try to, you know, stay on the right
path, and to do the right things. And someone can come along and take
it all away, just by going like that. lHe pointed a finger.] Just by
pointing their finger. That's all it takes.
The prosecutor was eventually disbarred for his misconduct, and the
case transferred to the state's Attorney General's Office, which
ultimately dropped the charges based upon unequivocal exculpatory
evidence.73 The lacrosse players began living their lives again-but only
after a year of psychic pain, public ostracism, and emptied family coffers:
Seligmann's family alone was thoroughly financially drained by the need
to pay legal fees and post $400,000 in bond to keep Reade out of jail
prior to the expected trial.74 The lacrosse players also suffered
interrupted or redirected educations, truncated sports participation, and
diverted career plans that stemmed from grievous wounds to their
reputations."
A conviction, in the view of many commentators, appropriately
should expose a defendant to stigma and ostracism, at least if it is
proportionate to her crime and ends when her sentence has been
served." One of the functions of criminal law, in this view, is to express
society's moral outrage at the violation of its central moral principles, the
principles that bind us into a single society.' But preconviction, there is a
presumption of innocence, a presumption that the Duke lacrosse players'
case shows is often well deserved.' Moreover, even if convicted at trial,

69. Id. at 14.
70. Id.
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Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 6o Minutes: Duke Rape Suspects
Speak Out (CBS television broadcast Oct. 5, 2oo6)).
73. See Luck & Siegel, supra note 58, at 25-27.
74. See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 59, at 189.
75. See Luck & Siegel, supra note 58, at 25-27; see also TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 59, at 145,
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76. See Taslitz, supra note 54, at 406-15.
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an offender might be convicted only of a lesser offense, meriting lesser
condemnation. Undue condemnation thus serves as a collateral or
invisible punishment beyond that imposed by the sentencing judge.'
Furthermore, excessive public condemnation postconviction but presentencing pressures the sentencing judge toward the harsher end of the
sentencing scale, a sentence resulting more from public outrage than
reasoned analysis.
The drafters may have used their prohibition against prosecutor
statements raising a substantial likelihood of "unnecessarily heightening
public condemnation of the accused"' to express the idea that some level
of deserved public condemnation is inherent in a criminal conviction.
This language may simply counsel the prosecutor not to make statements
that risk heightening condemnation beyond what is deserved. But this is
a risky business pretrial, where the "accused" is just that-merely
accused and potentially facing acquittal or conviction of a lesser charge
than the maximum sought, thereby meriting lesser condemnation or
none at all.
Furthermore, though legal theory counsels no level of condemnation
pretrial because of the presumption of innocence," the drafters may have
recognized that some level of condemnation will nevertheless necessarily
occur, at least in a high-profile case. But since no level of condemnation
is deserved pretrial, it is hard to see in such cases how the prosecutor's
increasing the prevailing level of condemnation could ever be
"necessary." Similarly, postconviction but pre-sentence, any heightening
of public condemnation risks tainting the sentencing process and the
accuracy of its results."3
Of course, postconviction, a prosecutor might conclude that an
offender has not suffered enough public condemnation. But allowing the
prosecutor's judgment about the deserved degree of condemnation to
justify using the media to heighten it is unwise. First, given the analysis of
media markets and the impact of technology in a fast-paced world above,
the accuracy of her judgment that public condemnation is too weak is
questionable in a high-profile case. It is more likely to be too high.
Second, and relatedly, is it really wise to trust even the most wellmeaning prosecutor with the discretion and enormous power of deciding
whether the level of public condemnation is adequate? How would
prosecutors be guided in making such a decision? Why would they be
79. See id. at 407-15, 437-39.

8o. See Andrew E. Taslitz & Carol Steiker, Introduction to the Symposium: The Jena Six, the
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better suited than sentencing judges to make such a determination, and
why should a prosecutor's determination be any more accurate than the
stigmatization embodied in the formal act of imposing a specific sentence
pursuant to legally specified criteria? Ultimately, the distinction between
"necessary" and "unnecessary" heightening of public condemnation and
the question of whether the risk of its occurring is substantial (if that
decision is left to the prosecutor) creates a morass of ambiguity, a risk of
abuse, and an invitation for error from which the justice system would
find it difficult, and perhaps impossible, to extricate itself. System
participants would thus either need to deceive themselves about their
participation in these wrongs or ignore the rules entirely.

III.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Part III now turns to the other side of the balance: the free speech
benefits of expression by trial actors, with Part III.A examining free
speech values and Part III.B focusing specifically on the role of lawyers,
especially that of prosecutors.
A. FREE SPEECH AND THE TRIAL PROCESS
High-profile trials are opportunities for debating basic values, thus
making them important public expressive arenas, for at least six reasons:
(I) they affect group status; (2) they serve as morality plays; (3) they use
juries to bring political values into the courtroom; (4) they aid in
governing by crime or counteracting it; (5) they prompt debate in the
court of public opinion; and, (6) they promote individual and collective
self-rule.
i. Trying Individuals Affects Group Status
A criminal trial is more than a dispute resolution mechanism.
Criminal trials necessarily involve political issues.8 The criminal justice
system is designed to brand persons with society's greatest mark of
stigma: a criminal conviction. But the fate of the individual is often
linked to the fate of socially salient groups."
Racial minorities, for example, make up an enormous percentage of
those convicted of crime." That reality links skin color to criminality, a
connection amplified by the media: The public face of crime in America
is frequently a black face.88 That outcome is no mere accident, though it
84. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 250
(1840) ("The jury is ... above all a political institution .....

(J.P. Mayer & Max

Lemer eds.,

1966)

85. See supra text accompanying notes 54-80.
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135-44 (1987).
87. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW
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need not turn on any conscious ill will.8 Studies have repeatedly shown
that the more "Afrocentric" one's face, the harsher the sentence;
likewise, the blacker the juvenile, the more likely she will receive
juvenile facility commitment rather than probation.' Other studies
suggest that skin color plays a significant role in what triggers police
suspicion of criminality in the first place." Moreover, skin color likely
plays an important role in convicting the innocent, affecting how
aggressively police seek confessions and believe informants, as well as
how "suspiciously" police-fearful minorities behave.9 2 All this operates at
a subconscious and institutional level, no matter how well-meaning the
individual actors." This sad state of affairs is also closely correlated with
class: when combined with race, poverty is an excellent predictor of the
likelihood of a criminal conviction.94
Yet if the processes occur unconsciously, the results are obvious for
all who care to see. Law professor Michelle Alexander has thus declared
our current incarceration policies the "New Jim Crow."' Former
prosecutor Paul Butler has called for massive acts of resistance by black
jurors, urging them never to vote to convict nonviolent black offenders.9
That many, or even most, of those arrested may be guilty does not
resolve the problem. Many commentators believe that societal factors,
such as poverty, residential and educational segregation, and weakened
job markets-all due to subconscious and institutional racismthemselves contribute to criminal behavior.' When such behavior occurs,
much of it is nonviolent and results in penalties thorou hly out of
proportion to any sound deterrent or retributive philosophy.

89. See id.
9o. See MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., wHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY

140-47

(2oo3) (summarizing studies showing that African-American children adjudicated delinquent
are far more likely than are similarly situated white children to face commitment to a juvenile facility);
see also William T. Pizzi et al., Discriminationin Sentencing on the Basis of Afrocentric Features,
io MICH. J. RACE & L. 327, 352 (2005) (concluding that sentencing harshness is linked to the extent of
the defendant's "Afrocentric features" as distinct from skin color).
91. See Taslitz, supra note 24, at 127-30.
92. See id. at 130-33; Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux: How Race Contributes to
Convictingthe Innocent: The Informants Example, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 1091, 1091-99 (2009).
93. See Taslitz, supra note 92, at 1091-122.
94. See J. McGregor Smyth, Jr., From Arrest to Reintegration, 24 CRIM. JUST. 42, 42-43 (2009).
95. See ALEXANDER, supra note 87, at 2-3.
96. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System,
105 YALE L.J. 677,715-18 (1995).
97. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 417,
428-31 (2009).
98. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT INAMERICA 17-26, 29,
34 (1995) (noting that most of the incarcerated have committed nonviolent crimes and suffer penalties
grossly disproportionate to any likely deterrent value while disparately impacting racial minorities);
see also generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, LEGALIZE THIS! THE CASE FOR DECRIMINALIZING DRUGS (Colil
Mcginn ed., 2002) (articulating a book-length defense of this point for drug crimes).
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Race and class discrimination and the corresponding politicization
of criminal punishment are thus a way for politicians to show support for
"good, hardworking Americans" and to build solidarity among a
frightened and fractured majority white population, resulting in
punishments that are not only excessive but also enduring.' "Invisible
punishments" persist long after sentences end, including bans on exfelons obtaining public housing, educational loans, and a host of other
benefits essential to real rehabilitation.oo These continuing punishments
themselves take on a racial tinge.o'
Many high-profile criminal trials in America can thus be seen as
skirmishes in a broader social war involving class and race. Even when a
criminal defendant is wealthy, the terms of race and class warfare can
dominate public understandings. That domination is particularly evident
in high-profile cases, such as the O.J. Simpson murder trial'o2 or the Kobe
Bryant sexual assault charges."
If that war seems aimed at criminal suspects, criminal victims can
become ensnared in analogous warfare, namely, over gender roles.
Perhaps the best example is the rape trial. Rape trials involving a consent
defense turn in particular on public conceptions of proper gender
behavior." "Consent," whose absence is a prerequisite to a rape
conviction, is rarely defined for jurors in any useful way.' Jurors thus
turn to their own ideas about how men and women should relate to one
another, the nature of human sexuality, and the meaning of coercion in a
sexual situation to determine whether consent was present.' These ideas
themselves stem from dominant cultural narratives about gendered
behavior." Dominant narratives usually work against women who have
violated cultural dating taboos, perhaps by wearing "sexy" clothing, too
readily agreeing to be alone with an unfamiliar man, or engaging in
"flirtatious" behavior.'" None of these taboo violations means, however,
that a woman has consented to intercourse. Yet many studies suggest

99. See MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA (201I) (outlining
an extended explanation of this reality); Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for
Solidarity Through Modem Punishment, 51 HASTINGs L.J. 829,829-33 (2000).
too. See Smyth, supra note 94, at 42-55.
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See id. at 43.
See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, An African-American Sense of Fact: The O.J. Trial and Black
Judges on Justice, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219 (1998) (discussing the O.J. Simpson trial and racial bias in
102.

criminal cases).
103. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 HARv. J.L. &
GENDER 381, 381-84 (2005).

r04. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S.
387,416-19 (1996).
io5. Id. at 421.
io6. Id. at 422-24.
io7. See id. at 429-3 1.
io8. See id. at 44o-48.
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that even self-identified "feminist" jurors are unlikely to be persuaded
that consent was absent when one of these situations rears its head."
The socially nonconforming rape victim is thus in a real sense a
dissenter, asking jurors to accept alternative narratives about values and
what her behavior means." Jurors deliberate, therefore, not only about
the raw facts-what happened-but about those events' meaning, in turn
deliberating about fundamental social mores, norms, and values."' A notguilty verdict under such circumstances stigmatizes the victim and
reinforces what many might describe as oppressive, gendered social
norms, thus indirectly affecting all women."' Moreover, jurors' underlying
values affect whom the jurors believe and thus affect what they conclude
the raw facts are in the first place." 3 The distinction between facts and
values at a criminal trial is therefore never a sharp one.
TrialsAre Morality Plays
2.
Even apart from links among victims, those accused, and their
salient social groups, every trial of an individual serves as a kind of
morality play."' Defendants struggle to craft one narrative, prosecutors
another."' Those narratives involve fundamental moral issues: the
alleged deception of the securities defrauder, the infidelity of the
murdered spouse, the macho posturing of the frightened gang member.
Each side may view events very differently."'6 Was a defendant's killing
done in his genuine fear of facing imminent serious bodily injury at the
victim's hands, thus requiring his acquittal for acting in self-defense?"'
Was the killing instead motivated by the defendant's sudden anger at the
victim, a heat-of-passion killing meriting a lighter penalty?" 8 Or was the
defendant's act one done in cold blood, for profit or vengeance?"' In the
real world, motives can also be hard to tease out. A defendant might be
angered at her victim precisely because she fears the victim, as an abused
spouse might be when she shoots her husband. 2 o Yet the law requires
to9. See, e.g., ANDREw E. TASLrrz, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 7 (1999); Taslitz,
supra note 104, at 468-71.
no. See Taslitz, supra note 104, at 435-39.
III. See id. at 419-24.
112. See id. at 493-94.
113. See id. at 419-22.
114. See ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 33-34 (2009) ("Placing the [trial]

facts in a narrative form 'is a demand... for moral meaning, a demand that sequences of events be
assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral drama."' (alteration in original) (quoting
Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in ON NARRATIVE (W.J.T.
Mitchell ed. 1981))).

115. See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 54 (discussing the proper role of prosecutors).
I16. See Taslitz, supra note 104, at 410-13 (discussing the Rashomon-like nature of trial facts).
117.
118.
I19.
120.

See
See
See
See

PODGOR, supra note 5o, at 315-22.
id. at 147-49.
id. at 130-35.
id. at 331-32.
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jurors to place those motives into one category (fear) or another (anger)
rather than accepting life's messy ambiguity. Even in the abused spouse
case, therefore, values necessarily play a role.
But a criminal conviction seeks to condemn not merely a morally
wrong action but an action that has in some sense injured the public
rather than solely the individual.I2 ' It is tort law that vindicates individual
harms, while criminal law vindicates collective ones, or harms to "the
People."'. In this sense too, therefore, every criminal verdict is political,
because it is a declaration via a governmental body representing the will
of the People-the jury-that the People have been wronged.
3. Juries Bring PoliticalValues into the Courtroom
Indeed, the jury is itself a highly political body.' Its political nature
is among its strongest justifications. It allows ordinary people to play a
role both in law creation-for example, defining "consent" in a rape
case, as discussed above-and law application.'24 In two cocommentators' views, the jury plays a role in the judicial branch similar
to the two houses of Congress.' In the latter case, the House and the
Senate check one another, each preventing abuses by the other. In the
former case, the judge and the jury check one another, the jury being the
more populist branch.",6
But the jury, while in some sense a "representative" body, is
primarily a deliberative one.' It is designed to engage in an exchange of
views that determine an individual's fate."' It does so pursuant to an
adversarial process intended to keep it advised of all relevant
information and arguments on both sides of each issue." 9 Its verdict
justifies the State's exercise of its authority to make legitimate use of
physical force, which will forever change the lives of the accused, of her
family and friends, and sometimes of the victim. The jury is thus both the
voice of the People and of a governmental institution to which parties
turn for fairness and judgment. Moreover, its judgment has not only
physical consequences, such as potential imprisonment, but
also symbolic
30
ones, the stigma and isolation of being labeled a "felon.,,'

121. See Taslitz, supranote 77, at 348-49.
122. See id. at 346-47.
123. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 84, at 250.
124. See Darryl K. Brown, Plain Meaning, PracticalReason, and Culpability: Toward a Theory of
Jury Interpretationof Criminal Statutes, 96 MIcH. L. REV. 1199, 1199-20i (1998).
125. See AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REALLY
SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 52-53 (1998).

126. Id.
127. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY

128. Id.
129. See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 59, 100, 120, 169, 179 (1999).

130. See Taslitz, supra note 92, at 102-08.
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4. Trials Aid in Governing Through Crime or Resisting It
The political nature of the criminal trial is further illustrated by the
phenomenon of "governing through crime."' 3 ' This sort of governance
uses "crime-fear" as a way to justify oppressive state policies and then
uses those policies as a model for governing other social institutions.'
Schools become ruled by "zero tolerance policies" and workplaces by
excessively invasive drug-testing policies.'33 The public's fear of crime
gives rise to the policy of ex-felon disenfranchisement; in turn, lifelong
loss of voting rights for ex-felons, who have long ago proven that they are
no longer a danger to society, disenfranchises precisely the minority
communities most hurt by crime, and by mass incarceration and its
concomitant racially discriminatory policies.'" Privacy and free speech
rights face erosion in the need to favor order, conformity, and social
cohesion as ways to calm fears of disorder, terrorism, and ordinary
crime. 3 s Because of its connection to these greater issues of governance,
the operation of the criminal jury necessarily affects how American
democracy more broadly operates and how it is understood by its
participants.
The media, of course, play a major role in all these processes. As
Part I of this Article explained, the media are drawn to stories that
amplify fears of crime, even at a time when crime rates are declining. The
media are especially drawn to novel or extreme cases, not the common
ones.3 6 Hence, the unrepresentative case becomes the high-profile one.
Yet it is this type of case in which the broader social issues symbolized by
criminal law and the criminal trial itself will be contested. The morality
play occurs not only in the courtroom, but also in the press room and on
the television and computer screens of the nation.' Investigative
reporters make careers writing books, then screenplays, about highprofile crimes.3' These cases even prod political action, leading to the

131. See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 4 (2007).
132. See id. at 4-lo.
133. See id. at 219, 222, 241.
134. See JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 69-84, 168-70 (2oo6).
135. See Nasser Hussain & Austin Sarat, Introduction: Responding to Government Lawlessness:
What Does the Rule of Law Require?, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW: THE RULE OF LAW AND
THE PROSECUTION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION I, 1-9 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2010)
(discussing the terrorism context).
136. See FULLER, supra note 14, at 76.
137. See LYNN S. CHANCER, HIGH-PROFILE CRIMES: WHEN LEGAL CASES BECOME SOCIAL CAUSES
(2oo5) (detailing this idea by examining selected high-profile crimes in depth).
138. See id. at 61 (discussing reporter self-interest); MARK FUHRMAN, THE MURDER BUSINESS: How
THE MEDIA TURNS CRIME INTO ENTERTAINMENT, at Xiii-XiV (2oo9) (discussing books he has written
about his cases, as an investigative reporter, while criticizing other reporters for skewing stories based
on their self-interest).
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passage of "Meghan's Law" to protect children, 39 higher insanity-defense
burdens after President Reagan's shooting,'40 and enhanced support for
ending parole after the "Willie Horton" advertisements helped to bring
down the Michael Dukakis presidential campaign. 4 '
5.

Trials Occur in the Court of Public Opinion, Too

The high-profile case thus requires arguments to two courts: that of
public opinion and that of the physical courtroom.'" Public opinion is, of
course, reflected in and molded by the media. 43 Because issues of
criminality are so closely linked to political and moral concerns in
America, those concerns necessarily are reflected in media portrayals
about particular cases. Broader political and public values and processes
thus necessarily affect how potential jurors will view a specific case,
making the media coverage of such a case of obvious interest to the
parties and their lawyers.'" Simultaneously, in a high-profile case, the
defendant, witnesses, and the State become seen as representatives of
particular moral and political perspectives, whether or not these persons
so see themselves.'45 Media access denied or restricted to any of these
persons thus may become seen by some members of the public as
silencing their voices. For these reasons too, party access to the press
becomes critical.
The general tenor of modern American law on free speech favors a
philosophy opposed to prior restraints, protective of offensive and even
linguistically brutal forms of combat, and generous to an exceptional
degree in limiting state restrictions on the varied forms of public
debate."46 Granted, that law also makes exceptions to this general attitude
and seems insensitive to the ways that an unregulated market in ideas
can often lead large and powerful speakers to silence smaller and weaker
ones. Nevertheless, the law's general tenor contributes to a reluctance to
silence media coverage of crime, including especially high-profile cases.4
139.

Catherine Arcabascio, Sexting and Teenagers: OMG R U Going 2 Jail???, 16 RICH. J.L. &
(describing Meghan's Law).
140. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Science: Scientific Evidence-and Statutes, 43 CRIM. L.
BULL. 739, 745 (2oo7) (describing the effect of Hinckley's acquittal, on the basis of his insanity defense,
for shooting President Reagan.).
141. Milton Heumann et al., Beyond the Sentence: Public Perceptions of CollateralConsequences
TECH. 10, 12 (2010)

for Felony Offenders, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 24, 25, 36-37 (2005).
142. See JAMES F. HAGGERTY, IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR
LITIGATION COMMUNICATIONS, at xix-xxiii (2d ed. 2009).
143. See generally RAY SURRETTE, MEDIA, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES AND REALITIES (3d
ed. 2oo6).
144. See Taslitz, supranote 104, at 417, 428-29.
145. See CHANCER, supra note 137, at 6.
146. See generally RUSSELL L. WEAVER & DONALD E. LIVELY, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (3d ed. 2009); W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.

305, 305-10 (2001) (comparing the general application of these doctrines to application to lawyers).
147. Denise M. Chanez, Note, Twohig v. Blackmer: New Mexico's Broad Protection for Trial
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Indeed, this coverage has become such an entrenched part of
American culture that it is a major form of public entertainment.'4 The
press and perhaps the People themselves would likely howl with anger
were important information sources (the lawyers) blocked by the hand of
the State. While many other western countries are more deeply
concerned than we are about fair trials, the distinctively American
conception of free speech seems to valorize coverage of the high-profile
case.' 49
For all these reasons, there is a strong conceptual argument to be
made in favor of preserving the use of lawyers as sources for crime
coverage by the media. Failing to preserve lawyer-sources would be
viewed by many as silencing the voice of individuals, collectivities, and
the People. Yet the need for a meaningful voice is central to the
American concept of self-governance, to which we next turn.'
6. Trials Promote Self-Rule
A meaningful hearing-one offering a real prospect of one's views
being heard, carefully considered, and bearing on the outcome-can
promote a sense of catharsis and empowerment, even on the part of
losers and dissenters.'"' The catharsis of being heard makes hierarchy less
oppressive, as does the sense that the oppressor's worst abuses will be
exposed and therefore chilled."' Research in procedural justice about the
trial and other dispute resolution mechanisms indeed supports this
conclusion. Defendants having a fair opportunity to make their case, for
example, that their confession was coerced by the police or their
prosecution racially motivated, are more likely to accept a guilty verdict
and less likely, all else being equal, to offend again.'
These examples are particularly apt, because they also demonstrate
how a truly public trial can expose, and therefore help to discourage,
abuses by the State. Respected commentators have argued that the
Confrontation Clause's protection of meaningful cross-examinationindeed, all the criminal procedure-related protections of the Bill of
Rights -aim partly at this checking-by-transparency function. 5 4 The press

ParticipantSpeech and the Hurdles to Cross Before Imposing Gag Orders,35 N.M. L. REV. 587, 587-8
(2s5).
148. See id. (mentioning Michael Jackson, Kobe Bryant, and Scott Petersen).
149. IAN CRAM, A VIRTUE LESS CLOISTERED: COURTS, SPEECH AND CONSTITUTIONS 93-98 (2oo2).
iso. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW, RELIGION,
AND LOYALTY 5-6 (1998).
151. See STEPHEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND RoMANCE 96 (1990).
152. See id.
153. See Tom R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 63 (2oo6).
154. See AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 125, at 52-53, 57; Andrew Taslitz, Catharsis,the Confrontation
Clause,and Expert Testimony, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 103, 103, 122-23 (1993).
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is an important part of creating the exposure necessary to that function's
being served well.'
A meaningful hearing also promotes collective self-rule. Self-rule
happens when the laws are made by the people to whom they apply.' In
practice, this means that self-rule requires participation by all citizens,
minority and majority, male and female, in making the laws.' As noted
earlier, trials involve law creation as much as law application.""
Meaningful, open participation by interested parties in this process of
law-creation by the jury is thus an act of self-rule. In the words of the
U.S. Supreme Court, "The maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional system." 59
Self-rule is often misconceived as an individualistic project: If all
citizens can express their views in a free marketplace of ideas, we have
self-rule.'" But mere individual expression to those who will not listen is
not a "discussion ... responsive to the will of the people . . . .",6, Self-rule
is, at heart, an effort to reconcile individual wills with a general will. But
a "general will" requires deliberation about our identity as a people,
"who we shall be, for what shall we stand."'6 , Our sense of being a people
or a "public" in a culturally diverse society requires confronting divergent
attitudes. Only when we learn to speak across our differences in search
of a common ground can our decisions be said to reflect a "general will."
This last point reveals the double-edged sword that is media
coverage of the high-profile trial. On the one hand, apart from the jury's
verdict, broader involvement by more of the public in the debate
potentially advances the clashing of views and discussion necessary to
craft a general will on criminal justice policy and application. On the
other hand, to the extent that the social forces described in Part I of this
Article dominate, this debate may be one that excludes or muffles or
distorts too many voices, making the resulting "will" not general or
deliberative, but partial and ill-informed.

155. See Taslitz, supra note 154, at 124.

156. My analysis of self-rule here fuses ideas developed in other sources. See ROBERT C. POST,
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 119-96 (1995); Hanna Fenichel
Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 343, 346 (1981); John A. Powell,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY,

Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality, 85 Ky. L.J. 9, 49-74 (1997).
157. See JAMES S.
CONSULTATION (2o09).

FIsHKIN,

WHEN

PEOPLE

SPEAK:

158. See supra text accompanying notes 123-25.

159.
i6o.
161.
162.

Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,369 (i93i).
See Pitkin, supra note 156, at 327, 343,346.
Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369.
Pitkin, supra note 156, at 346.
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Likewise, to the extent that press coverage and the general antidefendant atmosphere lead jurors to silence or not even to consider
dissenting views, to react instinctively more than deliberatively, and to
favor catharsis over accuracy, defendants and their sympathizers feel
denied a fair voice in the individual case outcome and in the broader
debate over public policy issues. Under these circumstances, media
coverage may undermine rather than enhance important political
functions of free press coverage of trials.
Such an undermining is no small matter. The Declaration of
Independence's bold declaration of the right to pursue happiness is at the
center of what defines us as Americans. 63 Yet the original conception of
that pursuit and modern social science both make clear that the quality
of government and political and social equality of certain kinds are all
essential ingredients to making the pursuit of happiness real.'' The
quality of government includes concerns about voice and accountability
and about the rule of law.'6 , Voice and accountability refers to the
"degree to which citizens participate in choosing their government and
the degree of freedom accorded to speech, association, and media
expression."'6 The rule of law combines concerns about the "likelihood
of crime and violence, the effectiveness of the police and courts, and the
extent to which officials abide by the rules of society.", 6 7 In wealthier
western countries, such as the United States, the "rules of society"
especially include muscular guarantees of personal freedom.'8 Trust in
public officials, particularly the police, is a critical contributor to
happiness.'69

A trial giving parties effective voice-voice with a real chance of
affecting outcomes'- rather than a merely simulated one may thus
seem to require free access to the press, including, in particular, the
ability to reveal alleged abuses by police or other state authorities. But if
social biases, media and market pressures, and inadequate trial
procedures make media coverage a means of silencing some while giving
voice to others, this undermines the important role of political equality, a

163. See CARTER, supra note 150, at 5-6.

164. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, The Happy Fourth Amendment: History and the People's
Quest for Constitutional Meaning, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 32-52 (2010) (tracing the history and social
science).
165.

See

DEREK

BOK,

THE PoLrnCs OF HAPPINESS: WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN LEARN FROM THE NEw

RESEARCH ON WELL-BEING 23, 181 (2010).

66. Id. at 181.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 22-23.
169. See id. at 23, 181-82, 201-02.
170. See Victoria Smith Holden, Effective Voice Rights in the Workplace, in FREEING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FREEDOM OF ExPREssION 114-24

Jensen eds., 1995).

(David S. Allen & Robert
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status reflective of all the People."' Moreover, if media coverage is
partial and misleading, and if it is not readily capable of being subjected
to critical scrutiny by the citizenry, as Part I explains, the weight of many
of the free speech benefits of high-profile trials-which turn on accurate,
open, diverse, inclusive, and complete public discussion-decline
considerably. Yet as the relative worth of these free speech values
declines, the relative harm to reputations pretrial rises as a
countervailing consideration, as Part II explained.
The balance between free speech interests and fair trial ones is thus
partly a normative question and partly an empirical one. The issue is
normative because of the various principles of political morality involved
in the balance. The empirical issue has not yet been answered adequately
and, given the current state of social science, is based upon our best
guesses. Such best guesses require further examination of the dangers to
a fair trial and the role of lawyers.
B.

LAWYERS AND THE DANGERS FREE SPEECH POSES TO A FAIR TRIAL

The standard objections to lawyers engaging in pretrial publicity are
simply stated: first, that otherwise inadmissible evidence will reach
potential jurors, including evidence available only to the lawyers, not to
the press; second, that shy witnesses will be discouraged from coming
forward and that publicity-hungry witnesses will slant their stories to gain
fame; third, that witnesses will confuse their independent memories with
the media's version of the facts; fourth, that the privacy of witnesses
(such as a complainant in a rape case) will be violated; fifth, that fear of
public pressure from publicity will cow jurors and judges into decisions
they otherwise would not make; and sixth, that lawyers will give in to a
conflict of interest between the needs of their clients and the lawyers'
financial interest in attaining fame.' Other major concerns are that the
innocent will be convicted by an angry mob rather than by a
dispassionate jury, and that witnesses and defendants will suffer insult
and stigma.' 3 These concerns are amplified in the case of prosecutors,
whose veneer of impartiality as a voice of the People may mean that the
public gives their words special deference.'74

171. See Taslitz, supra note 164, at 37-39 (analyzing the importance of political equality to
individual, communal, and national happiness).
172. See PETER A. Joy & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, Do No WRONG: ETHICS FOR PROSECUTORS AND

45-48,66 (2oo9).
173. See Laurie L. Levenson, ProsecutorialSound Bites: When Do They Cross the Line?, 44 GA. L.

DEFENDERS

REV. 1021, 1038-52 (2010); supra text accompanying notes 54-83.
174. See KENDALL COFFEY, SPINNING THE LAW: TRYING CASES IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION
242-43 (200) (explaining that "prosecutors command so much personal and institutional respect" that
standards governing their use of pretrial publicity are especially important (quoting a telephone

interview with former prosecutor Laurie L. Levenson)).
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Media coverage can also wrongly entrench party positions. A lawyer
who publicly commits to one theory-for example, that her client did not
do the act but was trapped by a deeply mistaken eyewitness-may be
hamstrung if later investigation suggests that a better approach is to
admit to the criminal acts but raise self-defense, insanity, or entrapment
defenses.'
Alternatively, an elected prosecutor running on a platform of
vigorously prosecuting a particular case may feel bound to do so even if
later evidence suggests that the opposite course of action is wise."' The
prosecutor may lack a clear-headed ability to evaluate a case rationally
because of the phenomenon of "nonrational escalation of commitment."'"
Once people commit to a course of action, most are reluctant to change
their minds. But that reluctance is dramatically magnified when they
have made their commitments public."' Two well-known ethics
commentators consider this phenomenon
of particular concern in regard to prosecutors. Recent studies reveal
early police and prosecutor commitments to prosecuting particular
individuals based on incomplete information and reinforced by
nonrational escalation to those commitments as factors in wrongful
convictions. A campaign pledge to prosecute an individual is a classic
example of an early and public commitment based on incomplete
information. It creates a psychological barrier to the prosecutor acting

in a way that later information may show to be both wise and fair."'
Lawyers are aware of the tactical, strategic, and ethical risks of press
coverage. Many lawyers, defense and prosecution alike, thus fear
communication with the press.'8 Yet in high-profile cases, such
communication may be unavoidable. The press will demand it. Defense
counsel's refusal to respond to perhaps flawed or overwrought
prosecutor statements, or to similarly exaggerated or overly dramatic
media reports will be perceived as concessions to their accuracy.'"" The
prosecution faces similar risks by its silence."a2
Avoiding the press is thus often not a practical strategic option.
Moreover, if, as argued above, there are political justifications for
permitting party speech in high-profile cases, and if lawyers, because of

175. See Joy & MCMUNIGAL, supra note 172, at 99.
176. See id. at 99-lo.

177. Id. at 99.
178. See id.
179. Id.

18o. This observation was also made by several of the lawyers participating in the roundtables on
the proposed revisions to the ABA Standards that I attended in the fall of 20oo at Boston College,
American University, and Vanderbilt law schools.
181. COFFEY, supra note 174, at 170 (though counseling frequent silence, recognizing that it is,
among defense lawyers, an "undervalued position"); Jov & MCMUNIGAL, supra note 172, at 64.
182. But cf COFFEY, supra note 174, at 242-43 (noting that, though prosecutors once were, and
some still are, reluctant to talk to the press, others assume that they must do so).
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their special training, are among those best qualified to help the client
speak effectively, then there may be sound political reasons to let lawyers
reach the press.
At the same time, however, the analyses in earlier sections of this
Article demonstrate that the risks to a fair trial and to the reputation of
the accused are always substantial in high-profile cases; the justifications
for restraining lawyers' pretrial contact with the media are thus
undervalued. The focus of this piece is on the prosecutor's obligation, but
that must be understood in terms of defense counsel's actions and free
speech rights as well. What are those rights?
i. Defense Counsel
The seminal case addressing lawyers' free speech rights in
representing clients is Gentile v. State Bar, which specifically involved
pretrial publicity. 83 There, Dominic Gentile, a lawyer representing a
defendant charged with stealing police-confiscated drugs, held a press
conference at which he impugned the prosecutor's motives and alleged
that the police themselves committed the theft.""
Gentile was charged with ethical violations rooted in a Nevada rule
adopting the ban on statements creating a "substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing" a criminal proceeding, 8 , which is now the core
provision of the proposed Standard that is the subject of this Article. The
Court approved of the substantial likelihood test but struck down the
version of the Nevada rule before it as unduly vague.
While there were numerous opinions in Gentile, its significance lies
in five members of the Court agreeing that the State may regulate speech
by lawyers representing clients in pending cases more readily than it may
regulate the press. 8 Moreover, these five members did so because they
concluded that lawyers are different, serving a special role.'" Thus, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion for the Court, stressed "that lawyers in
pending cases [are] subject to ethical restrictions on speech to which an
ordinary citizen would not be."'" Indeed, he concluded, "Even in an area
far from the courtroom and the pendency of a case," lawyers are not
protected to the same extent as individuals in other professions.'" A
lawyer is "an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an
instrument ... of justice."'' Thus, the speech of "lawyers .. . in pending
cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that
So U.S. 1030, 1033, 1039 (1991) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 1033, 1045.
Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1033-34.
187. Id. at 1o71.
188. Id.
189. Id.

183.
184.
185.
186.

190.

Id. at 1073.

191. Id. at 1074 (quoting Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 126 (1961)).
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established for regulation of the press. . . .""' Justice O'Connor
reaffirmed these principles in her concurrence.193
In response, the ABA adopted a press statements rule that used the
substantial likelihood test and, unlike the proposed Standard, also
contained more specific guidance for lawyers based upon the subject
matter content of their statements to the press.'94 The resulting rule,
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6, lists seven categories of
statements that an attorney may generally make to the press in a criminal
case.'95 Comment 5 to this Rule also creates six categories of statements
that are "more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a
proceeding, particularly when they refer to .. . a criminal matter, or any
other proceeding that could result in incarceration."'
Yet the Rules leave open wide areas for debate.' Perhaps more
importantly, as one well-known ethics commentator argues, Gentile's
validity is increasingly in doubt.'9 Gentile did not adopt a strict scrutiny
test but something more like a reasonableness balancing test for
examining limitations on lawyer pretrial media statements."99 But, as
discussed below, the Court may be moving toward a strict scrutiny test,.
and only a few of the Justices writing in Gentile remain on the Court."o
Furthermore, comment 5 prohibits largely only the "poison pills" posing
the greatest risk to a fair trial.20 2 That leaves ample room for pills causing
mere indigestion. Moreover, Gentile at most authorized after-the-fact
ethics actions, not prior restraints on lawyer speech." Gag orders on
parties are strongly disfavored; there is good reason to believe they
should, if to a lesser extent, be disfavored for lawyers too, despite
Gentile's "officer of the court" references.2 4

192. Id.

193. Id. at 1o81-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But on this point Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens, and Kennedy disagreed. See id. at 1o34-37 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the speech at
issue was critical of the government and thus lay "at the very center of the First Amendment").
194. See Mattei Radu, The Difficult Task of Model Rule of ProfessionalConduct 3.6: Balancingthe
Free Speech Rights of Lawyers, the Sixth Amendment Rights of Criminal Defendants, and Society's
Right to the FairAdministration of Justice, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 497, 519-24 (2007).
195. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 3.6 (1993).
196. Id. R. 3.6 cmt. 5.

197. See R. Michael Cassidy, The Prosecutorand the Press: Lessons (Not) Learnedfrom the Mike
Nifong Debacle, 7 LAW &CONTEMP. PRoBs. 67, 8o-86 (2oo8).
198. See id. at 76-77.
199. See id. at 76-78.
2oo. See infra text accompanying notes 211-37.
201. See Cassidy,supra note 197, at 76.

202. See COFFEY, supra note 174, at 146-48 (discussing "poison pills").
203. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Lawyers Have Free Speech Rights, Too: Why Gag Orders on Trial
ParticipantsAre Almost Always Unconstitutional,17 Lov. L.A. Ewr. L. REV. 311, 315 (1997).
204. See id.
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As anyone who has a television can attest, clients in high-profile
cases often wage media campaigns.o" Sometimes they are purportedly
done by the client, not the lawyer, though it is hard to see how the line
between the two can be effectively maintained." Indeed, says wellknown criminal defense attorney Roy Black, "[T]oday's lawyer has an
obligation to deal effectively with the media-it's a part of the job to take
a proactive stance with reporters."" Whether Black reads the ethical
rules correctly or not, many defense lawyers behave in exactly that
fashion.' But this raises the need for prosecutors to respond should
defense statements be inaccurate, likely to endanger the State's case, or
to ensure that its witnesses are being treated fairly. That is no idle
concern, some particularly inflammatory defense media campaigns being
well documented." The current Model Rules of Professional Conduct
permit responsive commentary, and my only point here is that some such
provision is wise.
2.
Prosecutors
In the view of leading ethics commentator and former prosecutor
Michael Cassidy, media coverage of political candidates' positions is
essential to informed public choices in an election, and there is no reason
to treat prosecutors differently from other elected officials."' In support
of his position, Cassidy relies on Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White,' which, he maintains, supersedes "officer of the court" language
like that in Gentile.2 13
White held unconstitutional, under the First Amendment,
Minnesota's state constitutional prohibition against candidates for
judicial office, including sitting judges, announcing their views on
disputed legal or political issues -Minnesota's so-called "announce
clause.".. In a pre-White precedent, the Minnesota Supreme Court had
limited the apparently broad meaning of the announce clause, declaring
it to reach only disputed issues likely to come before the candidate were
he to be elected a judge."' Comments on past judicial decisions were,
205. See generally COFFEY, supra note 174 (summarizing numerous such campaigns, both by
defense and prosecutors).
2o6. See JoY & MCMUNIGAL, supra note 172, at 63-69 (arguing that the law is unclear but that
lawyers probably face trouble if they counsel clients to say what the lawyers cannot, and noting that
lawyers may be ethically obligated to counsel clients on whether to conduct a media campaign).
207. COFFEY, supra note 174, at 164 (quoting Roy Black).
2o8. See generally COFFEY, supra note 174 (recounting examples)
209. See Kathleen Brickey, Andersen's Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 917, 942-59 (2003)
(analyzing one recent example).
210. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8 (1983).
211. See Cassidy,supra note 197, at 71.
212.

536 U.S. 765 (2o02).

213. Cassidy, supra note 197, at 77.
214. White, 536 U.S. at 788.

215. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967,986 (D. Minn. 1999).
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therefore, permissible, although a candidate's public insistence on
ignoring the stare decisis effect of such decisions was banned."'
Gregory Wersal, a candidate for a judgeship, along with other
plaintiffs, filed suit in federal district court seeking a declaration of the
announce clause's unconstitutionality as violative of free speech under
the First Amendment.' Upon the filing of cross-motions for summary
judgment, the district court held against the plaintiffs, concluding that the
announce clause was indeed constitutional."8 The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed."'
The Court concluded that the announce clause permitted content
discrimination against speech at the core of First Amendment
protections, and therefore subjected it to strict scrutiny.22 o The Court
found that the clause, even as narrowly interpreted by Minnesota's
Supreme Court, was not narrowly tailored to serve the allegedly
compelling state interests of preserving the actual and apparent
impartiality of the state judiciary."
There were, said the Court, three possible meanings of
"impartiality" in this context. First, impartiality might mean a lack of
preconception in favor of a particular view of the law.222 But such a goal,
insisted the Court, is "neither possible nor desirable"-impossible
psychologically and undesirable because it would reflect a "complete
tabula rasa," which is hardly the sort of learned mind sought in a judicial
candidate."' To pretend otherwise-to lie-for the sake of creating a
false appearance of this sort of impartiality cannot constitute a
compelling interest.2 4
A second meaning of impartiality might be "open-mindedness," a
willingness to remain open to persuasion, at least in a pending case, even
on legal questions for which the judge holds a preconceived position."'
The Court concluded, however, that the State had not met its burden
under the strict scrutiny test of establishing that campaign statements of
positions are uniquely destructive of open-mindedness."' The Court
noted that a candidate's promises to take a particular action were banned
by separate state laws, but that such promises were not before it, and in
any event, it simply was not persuaded that nonpromissory statements of

216. White, 536 U.S. at 772.
217. Id. at 768-7o.
218. Id. at 770.
219. Id. at 788.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 766.
223. Id. at 778.
224. Id. at 776-78.
225. Id. at 778.
226. Id. at 766.
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legal and policy positions would in effect operate psychologically as
promises committing the former candidate to action once sitting on the
judge's bench.'"
The third sense of impartiality examined by the Court was bias for
or against a particular party to the proceeding, the correct position being
that the judge who hears a case should "apply the law to [one party] in
the same way he applies it to any other party.""' On this point too,
however, the Court declared that "the announce clause is not narrowly
tailored to serve impartiality (or the appearance of impartiality) in this
sense.""' The clause only restricted speech concerning certain issues, not
comments about particular parties. The Court conceded that a party
taking a position in a particular case opposite that of an expressed
judicial view on an issue is likely to lose.23 o But the Court nevertheless
maintained that any loss would not be because of bias or favoritism
toward the party but rather because of the judge's even-handed
application of the law as he or she understands it.23 '
The Court rejected any rigid distinction between judicial and
legislative elections in a country like ours, where courts can "make"
common law, set aside laws enacted by the legislature, and alter the
shape of state constitutions.23 2 Accordingly, any abridgement of the right
to speak in the electioneering context turns First Amendment
jurisprudence upside down, for "'[d]ebate on the qualifications of
candidates' is 'at the core of our electoral process and of the First
Amendment freedoms,"' and it is "simply not the function of
government to select which issues are worth discussing or debating in the
course of a political campaign.""'
Despite White's apparent issues-versus-particular-case discussion,
lower courts have not recognized that distinction to be central to White's
point." Indeed, several lower courts have struck down application of
prohibitions similar to the White announce clause, but as applied to
judicial commentary on matters pending or likely to come before the
court."' These courts have reasoned that recusals of such judges to
protect trial fairness may sometimes be necessary, but silencing judicial
speech altogether is not."6 The bottom line is that even sitting judges'

227.

See id. at 778-80.

228. Id. at 775-76.

See id. at 776.
Id.
231. Id. at 776-77.
232. Id. at 783-84.
233. Id. at 781-82 (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S.
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 6o (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. See Cassidy,supra note 197, at 78-79 (summarizing cases).
229.
230.

235. See id.

236. See id.

214, 222-23

(1989);
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speech on pending matters is political speech, entitled to the highest level
of protection."'
Professor Cassidy argues that elected prosecutors' speech is
indistinguishable in any relevant way from judicial speech."' Like judges
in lower court cases, prosecutors are always running for office. If their
speech ends up endangering the right to a fair trial in a particular case,
less restrictive procedural remedies, like a change of venue, might be
necessary.239 But silencing the prosecutors' speech in the first place is
unwise absent the most unusual and compelling of circumstances.4
Prosecutors' speech about ongoing cases "serves a valuable public
function"24 ' because "the subject of legal proceedings is often of direct
significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy."24 2
As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, "it would be difficult to single
out any aspect of government of higher ... importance to the people
than the manner in which criminal trials are conducted....."2 43 Likewise,
Cassidy lauds prosecutors' public speech, because it keeps the public
informed about prosecutors' use of scarce public resources and the
choices they make about law enforcement priorities.2 " Prosecutors
correspondingly have "a fiduciary obligation to apprise their constituents
of how they are managing the public duties entrusted to them."24 5
Prosecutors' media comments can also further public safety by warning
of continuing dangers or against particularly vulnerable activities.246
Moreover, "public statements by prosecutors may assist in ongoing
investigations by encouraging other witnesses or victims to come forward
with information" useful in catching and convicting criminals.247 Finally,
"public dissemination of a prosecutor's activities is necessary to fulfill the
deterrent aims of the criminal law; unless the public is notified about
indictments and convictions, other would-be perpetrators may not be
8
appropriately dissuaded from engaging in criminal activity."
There might, of course, be an argument made that prosecutors have
a special ethical obligation to "do justice," requiring some degree of
impartiality, open-mindedness, and avoidance of any bias against an
accused as an individual that is akin to similar expectations of judges.' 9
237. See id.

238. See, e.g., id. at 77-79.
239. See id. at 78-79.
240.
241.

See id.
Id. at 73.

R. 3.6 cmt. 1 (1993).
243. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
242. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr

244. Cassidy, supra note 197, at 73.
245. Id.

246. Id.
247. Id.

248. Id.
249. See id. at 78-79 (making but implicitly rejecting such an argument); Levenson, supra note 173,
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But prosecutors are also advocates,"o and, argues Cassidy, even if they
have some special obligation of impartiality, it must be less than that of
judges."' Consequently, "the important lesson of White is that if there is a
relevant distinction between judicial elections and legislative or executive
elections, attorneys running for legislative or executive office ... are
entitled to more deference than judges, not less.""' Accordingly, insists
Cassidy, restrictions on prosecutors' speech should be analyzed under a
strict scrutiny test that is as protective of their speech as it is in most
other areas of First Amendment free speech law.253
I cannot accept Cassidy's argument wholesale. I think that he
overvalues the ability of procedural remedies to rectify the dangers of
prosecutor speech in high-profile cases and undervalues the harm to the
reputation of the accused.254 Less restrictive alternatives to silencing
prosecutor speech thus may often not be available.
But Cassidy does identify legitimate goals of prosecutors in talking
to the press, and he makes a more than plausible case that the Court
would be fairly protective of a great deal prosecutor speech and of the
need to be fair to the State, not only the accused, whatever standard of
scrutiny the Court might apply."' Moreover, his argument suggests that
the mere risk (not certainty) of harm to a fair trial may not necessarily
settle the matter, given the sometimes legitimate free speech concerns
that might outweigh even a substantial risk to trial fairness in a particular
case. After all, all of life involves risks, so a cost-benefit analysis is always
necessary. For the practical purposes of advising the Standards drafters,
as the roundtables seek to do, these observations offer sufficient reason
to be cautious about writing language that fails to allow for some casespecific justifications for prosecutors to speak for good reason.
At the same time, as discussed earlier, the dangers of prosecutor
speech to trial fairness and to an accused's reputation are serious.
Moreover, those same dangers can harm the public's ability to get
accurate information and to critique fairly the information that is
available, thus reducing substantially the theoretical free speech
justifications for protecting the prosecutor's words. It is therefore not too
much to expect prosecutors to advise the public of what they are doing in
particular cases without aggravating the dangers to trial fairness and an
accused's reputation that are already inherent in media coverage. Stifling
at 1025 ("[Wlhile prosecutors may have First Amendment rights, their responsibility to seek justice
can trump those rights.").
250. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 837,
865-66.
251. Cassidy, supra note 197, at 79.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 71-73.

254. See discussion supra intro. & Part I.
255. See generally Cassidy, supra note 197 (supporting both these points).
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important sources of media information, like the prosecutor, might
sometimes lead to more speculation than accurate reporting, but the
prosecutor does not further justice if he heightens the risk of trial
unfairness when he can still serve the legitimate goals of communicating
with the public.
CONCLUSION

Where does all this analysis lead us? I do not plan to answer this
question in full or to suggest new language to replace that offered by the
Task Force. In this brief Article, I cannot begin to accomplish that task.
Moreover, if anything, the discussion here suggests humility in weighing
conflicting concerns. Instead, particularly given that the Standards are
meant to be aspirational rather than disciplinary rules, I offer a few
principles that should guide the drafters in rethinking their product or, at
the very least, prompt them to think about that product in a new light.
First, there is always a "substantial risk" to a fair trial in media
communications in a high-profile case. That risk-based language might
have the U.S. Supreme Court's approval as consistent with constitutional
free speech principles if accompanied by language giving lawyers clearer
guidance on how to comply with the mandate. But the language denies
reality and serves merely to avoid the more difficult question of what
speech to permit, given the unavoidable existence of trial fairness risks.
Second, the media will raise risks to trial fairness no matter what the
prosecutor says or does not say. But, given the prosecutor's duty to do
justice and the high importance of the right to a fair trial, the prosecutor
should follow a principle of nonaggravation: make no statement having
the potential of aggravating the existing substantial risks to trial fairness.
That is admittedly hard to judge in some instances, so the prosecutor
should err on the side of minimizing statements made. Here are some
guidelines: Prosecutor press statements should not reveal inadmissible
evidence (or even evidence whose admissibility is in doubt) as such
statements undermine the primary reason for having an evidence code,
namely, to ensure that adversarial combat promotes sound, rather than
unsound, decisionmaking. Nor should a prosecutor address the "poison
pills," such as comments about the accused's character,"' known to raise
especially grave dangers to trial fairness. Moreover, perhaps the greatest
danger of an unfair trial is that of convicting the innocent. A prosecutor
should avoid revealing any matters posing a real risk of that outcome.
This is not guesswork; ample social science identifies these risks with
great specificity.257

256. See supra text accompanying notes 194-96.
257. See Levenson, supra note 173, at 1042-52.
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Third, the Standard should urge ethics authorities to draft rules that
include precise lists of "thou shall nots" in the rule text, not simply in
commentary, precisely because of the difficulty of some of the judgments
prosecutors must make."' Those "thou shall nots" should be more
expansive than the current list in the commentary to Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.6 and should include all types of statements that
heighten the risk of convicting the innocent and those that even
indirectly allude to racial appeals or stereotyping, as Professor Levenson
has argued.' Racial appeals are particularly damaging to the actuality
and appearance of trial fairness, including trial accuracy." Moreover,
they impose reputational costs on entire groups, not merely the accused,
a consequence that is never justifiable.26 1
Fourth, prosecutors should studiously avoid any pretrial statements
that could be read as disparaging the accused's reputation precisely
because the defendant is, at that point, merely the accused. A criminal
defendant is not deserving of any attack on his honor at that stage of the
proceedings, no matter how much an angry electorate might crave it.
Fifth, when prosecutors do speak, they should generally limit their
speech either to describing their actions (or inactions) and the reasons
for taking them or to seeking to protect public safety. Examples of
statements protecting public safety would include revealing that an
accused cannot be found or seeking to encourage witnesses to come
forward. All these prosecutor statements should be stated in a manner
consistent with the first four principles noted above. These sorts of
statements are adequate to convey to the public the information it most
needs to make judgments about how good a job the prosecutor is doing
and otherwise to achieve the goals of prosecutor-as-eternal-politicalcandidate speech that Professor Cassidy outlines.
Finally, a prosecutor should be free to respond to inaccurate defense
or media statements. This right of response has the potential to swallow
all other restrictions, yet concerns about reciprocity, protecting trial
fairness, and accurately informing the public suggest that a
responsiveness right is wise so long as it is used sparingly, modestly, and
accurately. One way to promote these goals is to require a prosecutor to
issue a written statement, to be publicly filed with ethics authorities
within a specified amount of time after making the statement, justifying
why the prosecutor felt the need for responsive speech. Ample social
science suggests that the mere need to justify your actions to others acts
258. See id. at 1042-55, loo (making these arguments and suggesting clear rules).
259. See id.
260. See id. at ro38-42.

Taslitz, supra note 54, at 403-o6.
See Andrew E. Taslitz, Reciprocity and the Criminal Responsibility of Corporations,
41 SrETSON L. REv. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 9-21) (explaining the morality and psychology
of reciprocity, albeit in the context of corporate versus individual criminal liability).
261.

262.
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as a restraint on inaccurate and excessive behavior."' Repeated
prosecutor training, including role playing, is also wise to avoid errors
arising from simple ignorance or incompetence."

Prosecutors serve important and complex social roles. They deserve
ethics rules that are fair to them as well as to other actors in the justice
system. But such rules must be realistic, candid about the difficulty of
weighing competing concerns, and attentive to clear guidance and
institutional devices for creating incentives to get the balance right. I
hope that this Article helps to contribute to the dialogue surrounding
how best to achieve those goals.

263. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunitiesfor,
Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHio ST. J. Calm. L. 7, 32-33, 64-68
(2010).

264. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identification, Democratic Deliberation,and the
Politics of Science, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL'Y & Ernucs J. 271 (2oo6) (discussing training's importance).

